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Abstract. Often, vaccination programs are carried out based on self-interest rather
than being mandatory. Owing to the perceptions about risks associated with vaccines
and the ‘herd immunity’ effect, it may provide suboptimal vaccination coverage for
the population as a whole. In this case, some subsidy policies may be offered by
the government to promote vaccination coverage. But, not all subsidy policies are
effective in controlling the transmission of infectious diseases. We address the question
of which subsidy policy is best, and how to appropriately distribute the limited
subsidies to maximize vaccine coverage. To answer these questions, we establish a
model based on evolutionary game theory, where individuals try to maximize their
personal payoffs when considering the voluntary vaccination mechanism. Our model
shows that voluntary vaccination alone is insufficient to control an epidemic. Hence,
two subsidy policies are systematically studied: (1) in the free subsidy policy the total
amount of subsidies is distributed to some individuals and all the donees may vaccinate
at no cost, and (2) in the part-offset subsidy policy each vaccinated person is offset by
a certain proportion of the vaccination cost. Simulations suggest that, since the part-
offset subsidy policy can encourage more individuals to be vaccinated, the performance
of this policy is significantly better than that of the free subsidy policy. Meanwhile,
for the free subsidy policy, if the individuals with more neighbors are freely vaccinated
with high priority rather than in a random manner, we find that the efficiency of this
subsidy policy is remarkably improved. In addition, for the part-offset subsidy policy,
we observe that too low or too high proportion of subsidy is not good for group-optimal
vaccination given that the total amount of subsidies is restricted. Instead, moderate
proportion of allowances can achieve the maximum of the social benefits.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
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1. Introduction
Preemptive vaccination is the fundamental method for preventing transmission of
infectious diseases as well as reducing morbidity and mortality. Many proposed
strategies, however, build upon a major premise that the vaccination or immunization
is compulsory and have not considered the willingness or desire of individuals, such
as target immunization [1], ring vaccination [2] and acquaintance immunization [3]
Practically, the immunization of individuals is more of a voluntary behavior. If
individuals are permitted to choose whether to vaccinate according to self-interest,
individual behavioral responses play a key role in determining the success of the
vaccination program and its consequences for disease control [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Meanwhile,
the likelihood of choosing vaccination is affected by many factors, including: perceived
risk of infection; cost of vaccination; and, the vaccination behavior of other individuals.
Many previous studies, based on the imitation rule [9, 10, 11, 12], the payoffs
maximization rule [13, 14], or the minority game rule to investigate the vaccination
dynamics [15, 16, 17], have concluded that it would be difficult or even impossible
to eradicate a vaccine-preventable disease under a voluntary vaccination mechanism
without additional incentives. The reason is that, with increasing coverage of vaccination
in the community, the individuals who are unvaccinated are less likely to become
infected, and therefore, they have less incentive to take a vaccine, and then due to
the existence of free-riders, the actual coverage of vaccination often cannot meet the
social demand [4, 5].
Though many authors have addressed the key role of human behavioral responses
on vaccination dynamics [18, 19, 20, 21], to the best of our knowledge, the influences of
different subsidy policies on vaccination decisions have not been thoroughly investigated.
In many cases, on account of the gap between the actual coverage of vaccination and
the social demand, some incentives, such as subsidy policies should be offered by the
government to induce more people to take vaccination. Faced with various choices,
which subsidy policy is the best one? How can the efficiency of the subsidy policy be
maximized with a restricted amount of available subsidy? In this work we move towards
answering these questions.
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Previous studies of the interplay between diseases dynamics and individuals’
vaccination behaviors have often assumed that diseases are transmitted in either
homogeneously mixed populations or random networks. A recent important
advancement, is the application of network theory to study epidemic dynamics
[22, 23, 24]. Network-based models have been shown to be able to accurately reflect the
heterogeneities in the number of contacts of individuals [25, 26, 27].
Motivated by these facts, in the present work we first develop a network-based
vaccination model in which individuals update their vaccination strategies by balancing
the advantages and disadvantages of vaccination. And we find that, owing to the ‘herd
immunity’ effect in voluntary vaccination mechanism, it is difficult to eradicate the
diseases. Hence, two types of subsidy policies are considered: In the first case (labeled
free subsidy policy), a certain fraction of individuals are freely vaccinated according to
the total amount of subsidies and the cost of vaccination; In the second case (labeled
part-offset subsidy policy), a certain proportion of allowances are subsidized to all
vaccinated persons. We show that the free subsidy policy is not helpful for improving the
probabilities of vaccination among non-donees, but actually reduce it. In contrast, the
part-offset subsidy policy can encourage more individuals to take vaccination, leading
to the better performance of this policy when the same amount of subsidies is supplied.
Furthermore, we verify that the efficiency of the free subsidy policy can be significantly
improved when the donees are chosen in a descending degree order rather than in a
random way. In addition, for the part-offset subsidy policy, we find that there exists
optimal proportion of allowance inducing the group-optimal phenomenon with the fixed
amount of subsidies.
2. Vaccination rule and subsidy policies
2.1. Vaccination update rule
We model the interplay between vaccination behavior and the transmission dynamics
on contact networks, where the nodes represent individuals and the edges represent the
contacts between them, along which an infection can be transmitted. For simplicity,
the networks remain static in our study. The number of neighbors of a node is called
its degree, and the distribution of these values is called the degree distribution [28].
In our model, individuals need to decide whether to vaccinate or not before
implementing the vaccination programs. Usually, the formation of the vaccination
opinion is affected by many factors, such as: the side-effects of the vaccines; fear [29, 30];
availability of information concerning the epidemic [31, 32]; and, the opinions of other
persons, to name just a few [33, 34]. Here, we assume that individuals update their
vaccination decisions by maximizing their perceived benefits (or in other words, by
reducing their potential loss). The perceived benefits of infection and the perceived
benefits of vaccination are given as [35]
P (Xi = 1) = − CV ; (1)
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P (Xi = 0) = − CIλi. (2)
Here Xi = 1 or 0 denotes, respectively, that the individual i accepts the vaccination
or not. The parameters CV and CI are the cost of vaccination and infection, and λi is
the perceived probability of infection. Let c = CV /CI be the relative cost of vaccination,
then Eqs. (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
P (Xi = 1) = − c; (3)
P (Xi = 0) = − λi. (4)
A more sophisticated definition of the perceived probability of infection λi by
combing a more diverse range of factors may offer a more precise model of reality, but
would also increases the complexity of the model. Here we define λi for simplicity as a
function of transmission rate β and the number of non-vaccinated neighbors kinv [28],
λi = 1− (1− β)
kinv . (5)
Eq. (5) indicates that the greater the number of non-vaccinated individuals within the
neighborhood, the higher the probability of being infected.
Following common practice, we assume the individuals are of finite rationality. That
is, the individuals prefer to choose strategies with higher payoffs (payoff maximization
rule), while it is possible, but unlikely, that the individuals can make worse decisions on
the vaccination strategy. An usual way to achieve the above purpose is to incorporate
stochastic element into the model: the probability of vaccination for the individual i is
given as [36, 37]:
p =
1
1 + exp(−α(P (Xi = 1)− P (Xi = 0)))
, (6)
where α represents the degree that the individuals respond to the difference of payoffs,
the larger α the more sensitive of the individuals. Our main results are obtained with
α = 5. We have verified that our results are robust to the moderate values of α (i.e.
1 ≤ α ≤ 30).
2.2. Model description
For each run of simulations, the following processes are implemented sequentially [28,
38, 39]:
(1) Construct a contact network. Empirical studies have shown that the degree
distributions of many social, biological, and technological networks are of power-law
forms rather than Poissonian form. Here we use the classical scale-free network—
Baraba´si-Albert network [40] (labeled BA network) with average degree 〈k〉 = 6 and
N = 2000 as the underlying structure of contact network (We have also checked our
results on other types of networks, such as the typical Poissonian network—Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
random network [41], and we found that our results are robust to the structure of contact
networks.).
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(2) Formation of vaccination opinion. Each individual is equally assigned a vaccina-
tion decision (i.e., vaccinate or not vaccinate) such that the initial vaccination coverage
is about 50%. Then the individuals update their vaccination decisions with the proba-
bility in Eq. (6). Such update rule is carried out in a parallel way until a steady state
is reached (1000 iterations for our model). Finally, each individual makes a vaccination
choice and the vaccinated individuals are immune to infection. After that, we start the
epidemic process.
(3) Epidemic process. The standard SIR (susceptible–infected–removed) epidemic
model is run on the network generated in step (1) with the final vaccination decisions
obtained in step (2). Initially, 5 individuals are randomly chosen from non-vaccinated
individuals as the seeds of infection to begin the epidemic process, and others are either
susceptible or vaccinated individuals. At each time step, every susceptible individual i
is infected with probability Λi = 1 − (1 − β)
ki
inf , where kiinf is the number of infected
neighbors of the individual i. An infected individual recovers and becomes immune
with probability g per time step. We run the model until no infection exists in the
system. Here, we calibrate the value of disease transmission probability to ensure the
final epidemic size to be equal to 90% in the case of non-vaccination in the population.
We can achieve this by fixing g = 0.25, β = 0.18 for BA network.
The equilibrium data are obtained by averaging over 20 realizations for the epidemic
processes, and 100 independent simulations for each process.
3. Effects of subsidy policies
Firstly, taking no account of the government subsidy, the effect of the relative cost
of vaccination c on the density of infection (I) and the fraction of vaccination (V )
are presented in figure 1. As expected, the fraction of vaccination decreases with the
value of c, leading to the rapid increase of the density of infection. Figure 1 also
demonstrates that the epidemic can not be eradicated if individuals make vaccination
decisions according to self-interest.
In what follows, two different subsidy policies are compared to emphasize the roles
of subsidy policies on the epidemic control. For the free subsidy policy, the total amount
of subsidies (labeled S) is distributed to some people and all the donees are vaccinated
free of charge. For example, if the total amount of subsidy S = 100 and c = 0.5, then
200 persons would be vaccinated at no personal cost. One counter-intuitive feature is
displayed in figure 2: the fraction of vaccination (V ) is not improved remarkably even
though the values of S increase from 0 (without subsidy policy) to 400 (see figure 2(b)).
As a result, such free subsidy policy has limited effectiveness on reducing the density of
infection (I) (see figure 2(a)).
To better explain this disadvantageous situation, the rate of vaccination among non-
donees (Vnd) is presented in figure 2(c). One can observe that, Vnd does not increase with
the total amount of subsidies S, but rather decreases with it. According to Eq. (6), the
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Figure 1. Without any incentive, the density of infection and the fraction of
vaccination versus the relative cost of vaccination c. The fraction of vaccination
decreases with the value of c, and which leads to the prevalence of disease.
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Figure 2. The effect of free subsidy policy amount of subsidies S on the vaccination
behaviors and the epidemic size: (a) the density of infection; (b) the fraction of
vaccination and (c) the fraction of vaccinated among non-donees as functions of the
relative cost of vaccination c for different values of S. For simplicity, we select S = 100,
200 or other values in our studies, but the value of S is not always fixed. Taking S = 200
as an example, when c = 0, the amount of subsidy will be zero; when c is very small
(e.g. c = 0.05) then S/c = 4000 > N = 2000, so all the individuals could be freely
vaccinated, and in such case the actual amount of subsidy is S = cN = 100; when
S/c < N , then we have S = 200 and we still label S = 200.
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Figure 3. The effect of part-offset subsidy policy on the vaccination behaviors and
the epidemic size: (a) the density of infection; (b) the fraction of vaccination and
(c) the total amount of subsidies as functions of the relative cost of vaccination c for
different proportion δ.
perceived risk of infection by those non-donees will decrease when more individuals are
freely vaccinated. As a result, those non-donees prefer to take risks after balancing the
advantages and disadvantages of vaccination. (For fixed value of S, we have S/c ≥ N
when c is very small. According to the rule of our model, all the individuals will be
freely vaccinated (see figure 2(b)), and this will lead to V = 0 in figure 2(c)).
For the part-offset subsidy policy, the proportion δc of subsidy cost is offset by the
government for each vaccinated individual. That is, each vaccinated individual only
needs to pay for (1 − δ)c when the cost of vaccination is c. In this case, the effect of
the part-offset subsidy policy on controlling the spreading of epidemic is presented in
figure 3, where the fraction of vaccination increases with the value of δ (see figure 3(b)).
And this leads to a sharp decline in the density of infection (see figure 3(a)). For
example, when c = 1.0, the density of infection is reduced from about 0.65 to 0.15 with
δ increasing from 0 to 0.5. In particular, as shown in figure 3(c), the total amount of
subsidy is rather low on the premise of the efficiency of subsidy. For instance, even 50%
of cost is subsidized, the total amount of subsidy S will be smaller than 350. Comparing
S = 400 in figure 2(a) with δ = 0.5 in figure 3(a), we can find that the effect of the latter
case is absolutely superior to the first case. The advantages of the part-offset subsidy
policy can be explained as follows: when those vaccinated individuals are offset by a
certain proportion of subsidy, from the individual’s perspective, the cost of vaccination
is reduced. Thus more individuals are likely to take vaccination by weighing the cost of
vaccination and the cost of infection, and as a result the density of infection is effectively
inhibited.
The effects of the two policies on controlling diseases under the same amount of
subsidy are studied in figure 4. Since the total amount of subsidies for the part-offset
subsidy policy is determined by the number of vaccinated individuals and the value of
δ, to fairly compare the two subsidy policies we first preset a value of S (e.g. S = 200
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Figure 4. Comparing the effects of the two subsidy policies on the density of infection
when the same amount of subsidy is supplied: Left: δ = 0.4; center: δ = 0.5; right:
δ = 0.6. Top panel: the amount of subsidy as function of c. Bottom panel: the density
of infection as function of c.
in the left row of figure 4) and determine the corresponding c (e.g. A in the left row
of figure 4) in the part-offset subsidy policy. Then the density of infection for the free
subsidy policy (e.g. B in the left row of figure 4 ) and the part-offset subsidy policy (e.g.
C in the left row of figure 4 ) at the determined c can be obtained respectively with
the same amount of subsidy. By choosing several representative values of S in figure 4,
we can find that the performance of the part-offset subsidy policy is generally better
than the free subsidy policy. Moreover, the advantage of the part-offset subsidy policy
is more noticeable when c is larger. We also compare the efficiency of the two subsidy
policies for other values of S, and find that such phenomenon is universal. That is,
the effectiveness of the part-offset subsidy policy on controlling the density of infection
dominates.
For the free subsidy policy, the beneficiaries are randomly selected (labeled random
free policy). Previous studies have pointed out that the structure of contact network
plays key roles in the dynamics of an epidemic. For example, due to the existence
of hub nodes (nodes with very large degrees), epidemic can easily spread on scale-free
networks. Nonetheless, the structural properties of a network can also give instructive
hints toward effective control of an epidemic. Targeted immunization was considered
by researchers and found that such strategy can effectively prevent the outbreaks of
diseases on scale-free networks [1]. Here the targeted subsidy policy is also considered
(labeled targeted free subsidy policy), that is, the individuals are freely vaccinated in a
descending degree order until the total amount of subsidy is used up. The density of
infection as a function of S for different values of c is presented in figure 5. As shown in
figure 5, with the increase of S, the density of infection reduces quickly, and the larger
value of c, the better performance of targeted free subsidy policy on reducing the density
of infection.
CONTENTS 9
0 100 200 300 400
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Th
e 
de
ns
ity
 o
f i
nf
ec
tio
n,
 I
The total amount of subsidies, S
 
 
 c=0.5
 c=0.7
 c=0.9
Figure 5. For targeted free policy, the density of infection as a function of c for
different values of S. The donees are selected in a descending degree order, i.e., the
nodes with higher degrees are vaccinated preferentially.
The efficiency of random and targeted free subsidy policies are compared in figure 6
for different values of c. Figure 6(a) plots the difference of the density of infection
between the random and the targeted free policy (IR − IT ), which indicates that the
targeted free subsidy policy is much better than the corresponding random policy in
suppressing the epidemic spreading when S is large. Notably, the larger value of c, the
bigger the difference between the two approaches.
One might think that the number of vaccinated individuals in the case of targeted
free subsidy policy should be larger than that in the random free subsidy policy.
However, Figure 6(b) shows that the fraction of vaccination for the targeted free policy
is less than the case of random free policy (i.e. VR − VT > 0). Such phenomenon
can be explained as follows: on one hand, when the random policy is implemented,
the individuals with large degrees cannot be preferentially vaccinated. Thus, according
to Eq. (6), these ‘large-degree individuals’ among non-donees are likely to voluntarily
choose to take vaccination; on the other hand, for the case of targeted policy, the ‘large-
degree individuals’ have been freely vaccinated, and only the individuals with smaller
degrees are not vaccinated. These ‘small-degree individuals’ among non-donees are less
likely to take vaccination owing to the lower perceived risk of infection. Thus, there
exist more vaccinated individuals in the random subsidy policy. Nonetheless, since the
‘large-degree individuals’ are freely vaccinated in the targeted free subsidy policy when
S is rather large, the effectiveness of targeted free subsidy policy is superior to the
random one, irrespective of the less number of vaccinated individuals.
From the perspective of group interest, the purpose of subsidy policies is to minimize
the total cost from both vaccination and infection or the prevalence of disease. In many
cases, the total amount of the available subsidies is limited. In this case, how to maximize
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Figure 6. The effects of the random free policy and the targeted free policy are
compared: (a) the difference IR − IT as a function of S. IR and IT are the density
of infection for random free policy and the targeted free policy respectively; (b) the
difference VR − VT as a function of S. VR and VT are the fraction of vaccination for
random free policy and targeted free policy respectively.
the utility of the limited subsidies is an important and significant task. For part-offset
subsidy policy, we will investigate what proportion δ of allowance can produce the best
possible results if the total amount of subsidies is limited.
According to Eqs (3) and (4), the cost of vaccination relative to infection is c, thus
the social cost from the group level can be defined as [5, 42]:
SC = NR × 1 + ((1− δ)c+ cδ)NV = NR +NV c, (7)
where NR and NV are the number of recovered and vaccinated persons. The impacts
of c and δ on the social cost SC are presented in figure 7. From figure 7(a), one can
observe that the value of δ has no significant effect on the social cost SC when c is small.
It is because the epidemic can be controlled by voluntary vaccination when c is small.
As a result, the effect of subsidy is negligible. When c is large (the left of red line in
figure 7(a)), we can find that there exist an optimal value of δ leading to the lowest level
of SC for every value of c. To explicitly reveal the relationship between the optimal
value of δ and the value of c, Figure 7(b) redraws the result of figure 7(a) starting from
c = 0.4. We can find that the the optimal value of δ increase monotonically with c (see
the blue line in figure 7(b)). That is, the larger value of c, the more subsidy proportion
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Figure 7. For part-offset subsidy policy, the total social cost SC as a function of
the relative cost of vaccination c and the proportion subsidy δ: (a) c from 0 to 1; (b)
c from 0.4 to 1. In (b) we redraw the result of (a) from c = 0.4 (the right side of red
line in (a)). The blue line given in (b) is to show the optimal δ for each value of c.
should be offset. We want to stress that, for rather large value of c, the optimal value
of δ is neither 0 nor 1. In other words, 0% or 100% subsidy policy does not minimize
the total social cost.
For some fatal diseases, the ultimate goal of the government is to minimize the
density of infection. If the total amount of subsidies S is fixed, what value of δ is
able to control the prevalence of disease to the lowest level? Figure 8 shows that there
exist an optimal values of δ leading to the lowest level of infection for every value of S.
Moreover, the optimal value of δ increases with S. We can explain such a phenomenon
from two aspects: on one hand, when zero or very small proportion of subsidy is offered,
the total amount of subsidies would not be completely exhausted. In such a situation,
the subsidy policy can not exert significant impact on the epidemic spreading; on the
other hand, if δ is very large, there will be only a few of individuals to get subsidized,
similar to the free subsidy policy, which failed to encourage more individuals to take
vaccination. Using the limited subsidy to subsidize as many individuals as possible can
guide more people to take vaccination. Thus, we can find that, the small value of S,
the lower optimal value of δ, which guarantees more individuals to be offset.
4. Conclusions and Discussions
Incorporating behavioral response into epidemiological disease spreading models can
enhance a model’s utility in evaluating control methods. Models based on evolutionary
game theory provide a promising approach to investigate the complex interaction
between human behavior and the disease transmission process. In this work, a network-
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Figure 8. For part-offset subsidy policy, the density of infection as a function of the
relative cost of vaccination c and the proportion subsidy δ for different values of S.
For fixed value of S, if the actual demanded subsidy is larger than S, some vaccinated
individuals are randomly subsidized with proportion δ until S is exhausted, and other
vaccinated individuals are not subsidized any more.
based model was proposed to address the impact of different subsidy policies on
vaccination coverage and disease prevalence when a voluntary vaccination mechanism
is considered. The results reveal that, without any external incentives, diseases will
prevail in the contact networks. Two different subsidy policies—free subsidy policy
and part-offset subsidy policy are studied in detail. We found that the free subsidy
policy is not able to encourage more non-donees to take vaccination, owing to the ‘herd
immunity’ coming from those freely subsidized individuals. Thus, the performance of
such a policy on suppressing disease prevalence is not remarkable. One possible way
of reducing the prevalence of disease for this subsidy policy is to subsidize individuals
in a descending degree order, that is, the individuals with more neighbors have higher
probability of being subsidized. Of course, this preferential subsidy policy require global
information of the contact network, i.e., the number of neighbors for each individual. In
reality, this is unlikely to be feasible — but such a strategy could be approximated by
identifying “high-risk” groups. In contrast, we have shown that: the effect of the part-
offset subsidy policy is prominent, it can effectively promote the coverage of vaccination
with fewer subsidies; and, it evidently reduces the prevalence of disease. For the part-
offset subsidy policy we also studied how to maximize the effect of subsidy policy when
the total amount of subsidies is limited. Both from the total social cost and the density
of infection in population, our results suggested that the best method is to distribute
the limited resource to as many individuals as possible.
How individuals deal with each new round of infectious disease is often influenced by
many external factors, such as rumors, mass media, online information, and publishing
the government information in a timely manner [18, 43, 44, 45]. In this work, we take a
first step towards understanding the impacts of different subsidy policies on vaccination
coverage and epidemiological dynamics. Some simplifying assumptions have been made
in the model. For example, our work assumes that the individuals act according to
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self-interest and make decisions that maximize their personal payoffs. In addition, we
also assume that the individuals have perfect information about the transmission rate
and the number of non-vaccinated individuals. All of these assumptions were made in
order to be able to keep the analysis manageable, and to be able to focus in detail on
the roles of different subsidies.
To refine our understanding of vaccination behavior dynamics and the roles of
different subsidy polices, further work could be developed in several aspects. First, how
important effects of subsidy policies on the control achievement are affected when some
individuals update strategies based on the payoff maximization rule and others follow a
different rule, such as imitation rule, majority rule or minority rule, and so on. Second,
given that some degree of altruistic behavior is a common phenomenon in our society,
we should ask how the roles of the subsidy policy are modified when the altruism is
taken into account [46]. Third, the effects of the rumors and fears on the vaccination
behavior dynamics are also worth consideration.
The disease prevalence, the vaccinating behavior of individuals, and the regulatory
measures from the government are all interdependent with each other, and hence should
not be studied independently. As our findings indicate, before implementing certain
regulatory measures, the government should also consider the effects of the human
behavioral responses. If an inappropriate subsidy policy is adopted by the government,
then the policy can not achieve the expected results and may generate unnecessary
waste.
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